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Abstract
Ganeri’s  discussion  of  mental  time  travel  and  the  self  focuses  on
remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of
future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate
the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of
Ganeri’s  interpretation  of three Buddhist  views -  by Buddhaghosa,
Vasubandhu,  and  Dignaga.  Is  the  scope  of  Ganeri's  discussion
confined  to  the  past,  or  is  there  a  stronger  assumption  that  future
thought always entails self-representation? I argue that if mental time
travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both
past  and  future  thought  should  be  possible  independently  of  self-
representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable
the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between
remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can
be further  contrasted  on the basis  of  distinct  ways of  constructing
past/future  scenarios  (field  vs.  observer  perspective),  modes  of
experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time
travel  (episodic  vs.  semantic  memory).  I  further  assess  the
compatibility  of  future-oriented  thought  with  the  three  Buddhist
views on the basis of these coordinates.
1. Introduction
Does mental time travel require a sense of self? Or, to use Tulving’s (1985) metaphor, can there be
mental time travel without a traveller? In 'Mental Time Travel and Attention',  Ganeri  addresses
these questions from the perspective of three Buddhist views on memory and mental time travel.
Owing  to  its  negation  of  the  self-implication  condition,  and  its  independence  from
representationalism, Ganeri favours Buddhaghosa’s view. While Ganeri’s arguments hold if mental
time travel is thought of predominantly on the model of remembering the past, one may wonder
where the future comes in within this picture. The range of the self-implication condition can be
explored through a set of distinctions involving future thought: the debate between continuism and
discontinuism, field and observer  perspective,  known time and lived time,  and semantic  versus
episodic memory accounts of mental time travel.  This paper aims to disambiguate the status of
future-oriented  time travel  in  relation  to  the self  from the offset  of Ganeri’s  investigation.  The
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motivation  for  this  inquiry lies  in  the role  of  prospection  in  current  psychological  research on
memory and mental time travel.
Remembering  the  past  as  the  paradigmatic  case  of  mental  time  travel  transpires  from
Ganeri’s definition of mental time travel, alongside his reconstructions of two of the Buddhist views
(Buddhaghosa's  and  Vasubandhu's).  From  the  onset,  describing  Tulving’s  challenge,  Ganeri
(forthcoming) defines mental time travel from the perspective of the past: ‘mental time travel is the
reliving or re-experiencing of an experience one has had before, a relocating of oneself in subjective
time to the past (or, equally, to the future)’ (p. 3). Likewise, the reconstruction of Buddhaghosa’s
view focuses on the past, with no mention whether the future would by default require the self, or
whether  this  perspective  may  be  extended  to  the  future:  ‘Buddhaghosa’s  contribution  to  this
discussion is to argue that consciousness of one’s past can be grounded in a type of autonoesis that
does not require self-representation’ (p. 16, my emphasis). Moreover, in Ganeri's description of
Vasubandhu's  approach,  future-oriented  thought  only  appears  in  conjunction  with  self-
representation:  ‘for  Vasubandhu,  however,  both  autobiographical  episodic  memory  and  future-
oriented thought are forms of delusion...’ (p. 24). While not overtly stating it, Ganeri appears to
either confine his talk about time without self to the past, or, on a stronger claim, to assume that the
self-implication condition always holds for future-oriented mental time travel.  In what follows I
show that both interpretations above – extending Ganeri’s argument for the past to the future, or
arguing that unlike the past, future thought requires a sense of self - can find support in present
psychology. 
2. The importance of mental time travel towards the future
Regarding the role of memory and mental time travel, one hypothesis from psychology focuses on
the pursuit of future goals, rather than on remembering past events. For instance, Suddendorf and
Corballis claim that ‘the crux of mental time travel lies in its role in enhancing biological fitness in
the future, so that mental time travel into the past is subsidiary to our ability to imagine future
scenarios’  (2007:  302).  Klein  brings  forth a  proposal  along the  same lines:  ‘it  is  possible  that
memory enabled humans, over the course of evolutionary history, to be aware of the future before
we were able to consciously experience the past’ (2013: 64). It should be noted that these claims are
made from a naturalistic perspective, where the preservation of the self holds a central role. My
focus, however, rests on a number of philosophical issues related to the function of future-oriented
mental time travel, as well as its relation to remembering the past.
One issue is the debate over continuity versus discontinuity between future and past-oriented
mental time travel. Perrin and Michaelian (2017) describe discontinuism and continuism as follows:
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‘for the latter, there is a difference in kind between what we do when we remember the past and
what we do when we imagine the future; for the former, there is only a difference of degree’ (p.
229).  For  the  purposes  here,  adherence  to  one  of  these  views  may  bring  about  different
consequences  with respect  to  the relation  between mental  time travel  towards  the  past  and the
future. Continuism would require an explanation of imagining the future consistent with the main
characteristics of remembering the past. By contrast, discontinuism would leave open the possibility
of completely distinct processes involved in thinking about the past and the future, and the two can,
at least in principle, be investigated separately.1 The consequences of these two stances, along with
the connection between semantic memory and imagining the future will be brought together with
self-implication in the next section.
Another issue, analyzed by Klein and Steindam (2016), is the relation between mental time
travel and the subjective experience of temporarily. The authors distinguish between ‘lived time’
and ‘known time’. As the authors put it, ‘in the former case, subjective temporality is directly given
as part of one’s occurrent mental state, whereas in the latter, subjective temporality is the product of
inferential or interpretive acts’ (p. 142). For my purposes here, the key difference is that unlike
‘known time’, ‘lived time’ requires a sense of self. In continuation of Tulving’s (1985) work, the
authors extend ‘known time’ to noetic consciousness and future scenarios on the basis of semantic
memory: ‘by allowing that noetic consciousness can promote a form of temporal subjectivity based
on conceptual analysis (i.e., “known time”), the construct can be modified to accommodate the type
of subjective temporality  associated with semantic-based FMTT [future mental  time travel]’ (p.
143).  The future scenarios  based on semantic  memory go against  the view that  future-oriented
mental  time  travel  originates  exclusively  in  episodic  memory,  and  is  illustrated  by  Klein  by
reference to patients with memory impairments who can imagine a public future, but lack the sense
of ownership of the scenario (see D.B.’s case, in Klein 2013).
A final distinction is between observer perspective and field perspective (Nigro and Nisser
1983). The field perspective, despite its association with the first person perspective,  appears to
correspond largely to memories where one remembers a view, but not one having experienced the
view: ‘... the scene appears from one’s own position; one seems to have roughly the field of view
that was available in the original situation and one does not “see oneself” (Nigro and Nisser 1983:
467-468). This is contrasted with memories where one sees one’s self, from a third person view,
having  the  same  experience.  Research  by  McDermott  et  al.  (2016)  shows  that  these  two
perspectives also apply to anticipating the future. The work by Nigro and Nisser, McDermott et al.,
1  On the classification by Perrin and Michaelian, extreme discontinuism holds that the two can be investigated 
separately.
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and D’Argembeau and Van der Linden converges on the prevalence of the observer perspective for
events going further back or forward in time. This distinction is important for the paper here for two
reasons.  Firstly,  the  field  perspective  may  be  compatible  with  scenarios  akin  to  the  one  by
Buddhagosa’s, where a memory is reenacted as if one were reexperiencing it without seeing one’s
self as part of the memory. With the addition of insights by McDermott et al., this may provide a
lead to extending Ganeri's take on Buddhagosa’s view to the future. Namely, if remembering a past
experience  is  a  kind  of  simulation  (Ganeri  2017:  414),  the  same  paradigm  could  apply  to
anticipating an experience constituted of familiar states. Secondly, if this distinction applies to both
future and past, it adds to the evidence for continuism: people can experience both the future and
the past from both perspectives.
3. Future-oriented mental time travel and the self
The distinctions above help disambiguate the relation between future-oriented mental time travel
and the self-implication condition. Notably, the psychological evidence favouring continuity would
imply that the possibility of remembering one’s past without remembering one’s experiencing it
may equally apply to imagining the future. The distinctions between lived time and known time, as
well as the observer and the field perspective would flesh out the continuist picture. By contrast,
discontinuity would enable a separate treatment of remembering the past, imagining the future, and
their connection to the self-implication condition.
If there is continuity between past and future-oriented mental time travel, and it is possible
to remember the past without a sense of ownership of the experience, then the same should hold for
anticipating  the  future.  The  question  is  how  to  describe  a  future  scenario  where  there  is  no
ownership from the subject's part. There are two answers, based on the distinctions by Nigro and
Nisser on the one hand, and Klein and Steindam, on the other hand. Firstly, the field perspective can
be mapped onto future scenarios without including one’s sense of self. Thus, it would be possible,
for instance, for one to anticipate seeing a sunset from the field perspective, without conceptualizing
one’s self as watching the sunset,  on the basis of previous acquaintance with the surroundings,
having  watched  sunsets  from  different  angles  etc.  As  sketched  above,  connecting  the  field
perspective to the future may provide the starting point for an extension of Ganeri's considerations
on Buddhaghosa and recollecting the past. Ganeri's (2017) approach to mental time travel towards
the past  as simulation  may as well  work for future scenarios  involving previously experienced
components  (as  opposed  to,  say,  a  scenario  based  on recollection).  Secondly,  future  scenarios
independent  from the  sense  of  self  can  fall  under  ‘known time’.  As  shown  by  Klein  (2013),
imagining  future  scenarios  on  the  basis  of  semantic  memory  is  possible  under  impairments  of
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episodic memory. One example is the patient  D.B., who, despite remembering past events,  had
trouble claiming ownership of his memories. Nevertheless, he could anticipate a public future. The
possibility  of  constructing  both  past  and future  scenarios  on  the  basis  of  semantic  memory  is
consistent with continuism. The difference between this way of imagining the future and the field
perspective is that ‘known time’ is inferential. That is, one can reconstruct the past or project the
future by putting together information which does not necessarily involve one’s self. This picture is
more sophisticated than the reconstruction of Buddhaghosa’s view, as it requires representation, and
may work as an interpretation of reflexivity under Dignaga’s view. Finally, it should be noted that
continuism is not completely incompatible with the self-implication condition. If the self is defined
such that it accommodates differences in degree, but not in kind, between remembering the past and
anticipating the future, then the self-implication condition need not stand or fall along continuity
between past and future-directed mental time travel.
If mental time travel towards the future and towards the past are discontinuous, then the self-
implication  requirement  may  contribute  to  the  difference  in  kind  between  the  two.  Under  the
assumption of discontinuity, it could be the sense of self as such, or a set of capacities that may
apply to the future but not to the past constituting the self, that distinguish past from future-oriented
mental  time  travel.  In  relation  to  the  ‘lived  time’-‘known  time’  distinction,  a  version  of
discontinuity reliant on self-implication would deny the possibility of future scenarios based solely
on known time,  and thus,  even when they originate  in  semantic  memory,  the self  may still  be
present. This appears to hold in Klein’s (2013) interpretation of the situation of another patient,
R.B., who can imagine a personal future on the basis of semantic memory. The self-implication
condition for future-oriented mental time travel under the discontinuity assumption can be further
supported by the naturalistic perspective sketched above. Namely, if the purpose of memory and
mental  time  travel  is  the preservation  of  one’s  self,  the sense of  self  may not  be essential  for
remembering the past, but it is always present upon imagining the future. This can be strengthened
by the observer perspective holding for distant future, where scenarios are more often accompanied
by a vision of one’s self in third person perspective. While this appears to be inferential, as in the
case of known time, the representation of the time traveller is necessary. As with continuism above,
discontinuism does not necessarily rule out the possibility  of future-oriented mental  time travel
without the self. Nevertheless, since under discontinuism remembering the past and imagining the
future may be underwritten by different capacities, an account of future-oriented mental time travel
independent from the self-implication condition would need to employ structures different from
those that hold for past-oriented time travel.
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4. Conclusions
Simply put, if Ganeri’s argument mainly applies to past-oriented mental time travel, the current
investigation  could  widen its  scope,  to  include  the  future.  However,  if  Ganeri  assumes  future-
oriented mental time travel to entail the self, then this stance can draw either from a commitment to
a version of discontinuism focusing on the self, or from a definition of the self consistent with the
evidence for continuity (i.e., as a matter of degree) applying to the future, but not to the past.
If  future  and  past-oriented  mental  time  travel  are  continuous,  the  self-implication
requirement can hold for the future and not the past only if the concept of self relies on differences
in degree between the two. If the past and future modes are discontinuous, the self, as a requirement
for  imagining  the  future,  may  be  one  of  the  features  distinguishing  them.  If  the  discontinuity
amounts to different capacities, then future scenarios independent from a sense of self are possible,
but they should be accounted for independently of what holds for remembering the past. Another
consequence is that admitting of future scenarios involving ‘known time’ only would enable future-
oriented mental time travel without the self. Thus, tying future scenarios to the sense of self, would
also imply that projecting, simulating, and imagining involve ‘lived time’. This appears to be in line
with  Klein’s and Steindam’s interpretation of Tulving’s original considerations. Finally, the field
and  observer  perspectives  can  support  both  interpretations  –  the  field  perspective  for  future
scenarios may be an instance of imagining the future without imagining one’s self experiencing it,
while the observer perspective for distant future events can be interpreted through the naturalistic
claim that mental time travel would ultimately serve purposes linked to the self.
Regarding the three Buddhist approaches,  Ganeri's  interpretation of Buddhaghosa’s view
applies  to  past-oriented  mental  time  travel,  and  could  be  extended  to  the  future  under  a  view
coalescing  the  field  perspective  and  future  thought.  Vasubandhu’s  considerations  on  the  mind
would gain more support from a view explaining the connection between the future and the self
(through ‘lived time’, or the naturalistic focus on the future). Dignaga’s concept of reflexivity could
support personal and impersonal interpretations in accordance with the stance of whether past or
future representations are necessarily tied to self-representation. In the case of continuity, known
time  and semantic  memory  may  provide  impersonal  future  scenarios  that  nevertheless  involve
representations. In the case of discontinuity, even with the semantic memory in place, and under
impairments of episodic memory there may still be a sense of self (as Klein interprets R.B.’s case).
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